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1 A 2004  symposium on resource  scarcity  in  rural  Africa  produced  the  papers  in  this
volume which explore  relations  between scarcity  and conflicts.Yet  the  authors  warn
emphasis on scarcity misses the point that vested interests use scarcity as pretexts for
their ambition to control other resources, and that the well-to-do stand to gain more
from conflicts than the poor.Tulmin shows that the vulnerable tend to be crowded out
from  access  to  land,  and  Witsenburg  et. al. in  their  well-researched  article  about
pastoralists  note  that without  state  or  political  interference  create  conflict  while
traditional societies have regulatory mechanisms for times of scarcity (droughts) which
reward cooperation.Unfortunately, no paper deals with the much severer urban or sub-
urban situations.
2 Bill Derman’s opens by defining scarcity as limited supply (demand greater than supply)
of a useful good, and arguing that a non-renewable resources like land will increase in
value with scarcity,  for  example population growth.While  links between scarcity and
conflict  were  postulated  by  Malthus  and  the  Club  of  Rome,  recent  debates  on
deteriorating environment as cause of conflict and poverty revive it.Research projects at
University of  Toronto,  Swiss  Peace Foundation and University of  Oregon (Freshwater
Project) explore such links—and in freshwater disputes, at least, co-operation exceeds
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conflicts.The  Hauge-Ellison  hypothesis  that  countries  suffering  from  environmental
degradation  are  more  prone  to  civil  conflict  and  “alarmist  prognoses  of  world
environmental wars” are untenable, and economic exceed environmental factors.
3 Part  I  deals  with  “Customary  land  tenure”  in  Ghana,  Cameroon  and  Sudan,  where
“traditional”  authorities  control  access  to  land  and  restrict  migrants,  youth  and
women.Part  II  covers  land  policy  and reforms  in  West,  South  and  East  Africa  with
Tulmin’s  paper  being  a  cross-national  survey  showing  that  vulnerable  groups  are
gradually  being  squeezed out  of  the  market.Part  III  discusses  Land and Identity  (i.e.
Ethnicity)  among  which  Witsenburg’s  about  adaptation  and  shifting  identities  in
Northern Kenya is important.It  shows traditional  institutions coping with short term
scarcity  and  allowing  access  by  enforceable  property  rights  and  various  social
adaptations (assuming more population needs more land, which often is compensated by
out-migration or smaller holdings).
4 Kojo S.Amanor argues that “customary tenure” was imposed by colonial authorities as
chiefly  domain  to  facilitate  integration  into  world  markets.“Traditional”  rulers  were
confirmed as custodians of land and traditions, whereas pre-colonial land was vested in
clans or families.Chiefs were encouraged to transact local resources with concessionaires
and migrants under “native authority” frameworks and bye-laws rewarding them with
royalties,  and levies  on migrants  raising their  following,  while  reducing commoners’
resources.Young  men  eventually  challenged  the  chiefs’  positions  and  migrants’
rights.After Independence authorities manipulated the concept of “customary” to permit
expropriation of land/forests by elites, whereas pre-war ordinances required courts to
ensure that  customary rights were not violated by concessions.Now forest  codes and
timber laws give concessions ownership of trees on community land, whereas previously
they belonged to farmers.Awarding concessions on community land basically becomes a
tool to evict forest communities.The imposition of the “customary” from above tends to
confirm the colonial expropriation of rural people by privileged national elites.
5 Quentin  Gausset,  “Land  Tenure  and  Land  Conflict  in  Northern  Cameroon,  The
Kwanja”.The Kwanja left the Adamawa plateau in the 19 c. because of Fulani raids, and
despite colonial pacification remain in the Tikar plains.While their chiefs do not compete
over land they gather people and prestige thru generosity, magical means or welcoming
migrants.Conflicts are more over symbols of land (e.g. territorial boundaries), status and
power.However, migrants from the Northwest settling in Kwanjaland for farming cause
revalidation of chiefly titles on plateau lands which remains inalienable because of beliefs
such  as  returning  souls,  sites  for  chiefs’  burials  or  fertility  rituals.Key  issues  of
distribution are not land scarcity but questions of status and migrants are given land to
raise chiefs’ status.Farming rights are inherited in family—but not by migrants or Fulani
pastoralists.Conflicts are not over scarce resources but over management rules (rights) or
conflict resolution.A major conflict is with government which rejects customary rights
claiming  that  Cameroonian  have  the  right  to  settle  wherever  they  want,  and,  while
unable to protect migrants silently appreciates chiefs’ authority—and cooperation.
6 Kjersti  Larson,  “Adaptability,  Identity  and  Conflict  Mediation  among  Hawawir  in
Northern Sudan”.The Hawawir consider themselves arabs, i.e. nomadic pastoralists, and a
qabil with  a  common  origin,  territory  and  juridical-political  system  (Nazir,  umda,
sheikh).They had lived as agro-pastoralists in their dar, homeland, in the wadi Magadam,
moving  internally  between  zones  of  low  and  high  rainfall—occasionally  permitting
agriculture.The  land  in  Wadi  Magadam is  government  owned,  communally  held  and
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managed,  because  all  land  outside  the  Nile  valley  is  under  “communal  ownership”
(characteristic of state-owned land).Due to drought their traditional labor migration to
the  Nile  valley  became  permanent.As  most  of  them  lost  their  livestock  during  the
drought, many went to urban areas, but opening of an irrigation scheme induced many to
return  to  Wadi  Magadam.They  organize  themselves  differently  from those  who  had
continued to live in the homeland according to the ideal of transhumance.This shows that
pastoralists adapt to new biophysical conditions, despite the fact that most governments’
preference for sedentary agricultural life.
7 Camilla Toulmin’s paper “Negotiating Access to Land in West Africa: Who’s losing out?”
surveys 9 countries with various types of  access  to land.She arrives at  the following
generalizations: Land claims are based on a) first occupation or clearing, b) conquest, c)
long-term occupation creating use rights or d) government allocation,  e.g.  settlement
schemes.Clans, families, chiefs, religious leaders, councils and governments negotiate and
administer land rights without formalized agreements or uniform rules of access.While
guaranteed access (primary rights) secures livelihoods, it creates inequality, poverty and
underdevelopment.Changing  pressures,  regulations  or  mechanisms  generate  tensions
among users.Derived or secondary rights give access through share contracts mostly held
by migrants or women.With land getting scarcer money payments, purchases or short
contracts become the rule.As new migrants compete with urban buyers original residents
assert their rights and re-negotiate terms—often fuelled by political propaganda—often
excluding migrants.Poorer groups (including family members) find themselves crowded
out  by  richer  bidders,  who  are  favored  by  politicians.A  shift  from  centralized  to
decentralized land authorities able to interpret local situations and cultural practices,
might solve this problem, though traditional authorities may challenge those.
8 Poul  Wisborg,  “Land  Tenure  Reform  in  Namaqualand,  South  Africa”.  Trancraa
(Transformation of Certain Rural Areas Act) of 1998 planed land transfer from state to
local  level  and  was  introduced  to  6  areas  in  semi-arid  Namaqualand,  but  ended  in
stalemate between local and external actors in one, Komagga.Reform became engulfed in
conflict because one residents’ association strongly opposed to it, questioning the state’s
legitimacy of  land ownership—challenging the original  division into “town land” and
“remainder”,  and  wanted  town  excluded  from  the  reform  in  favor  of  municipal
ownership.The  transfer-of-land  approach  in  Komagga  underestimated  the  extent  to
which people felt they owned the land already.A gradual clarification of individual vs.
communal statutory rights would have been more beneficial and avoided the struggle by
local groups over economic and political advantages.Speaking about conflict resolution
without  speaking  about  and  to  power—and  lack  of  trust  in  locals—makes  conflict
resolution risky, especially where incentives (Trancraa offered neither redress for past
losses nor support) for participation are lacking.
9 Nancy Andrews, “Land Reform and the Rekindling of Land Conflict in South Africa”.ANC’s
land reform program targeted landless farm laborers, but only wealthier blacks are able
to  buy  land  from whites  as  the  1984  Constitution  ruled  out  expropriation  of  white
holdings.Despite plans to redistribute 30% of dispossessed agricultural land in five years,
the restitution program was closed in 1998—after processing 70.000 claims for 20% of
rural  land.55% of  20  million  blacks  are  women heading  more  than  50% households,
producing 60% of food consumed in rural areas and providing 80% of farm labor.Food
security  is  a  major  issue,  but  men’s  and  women’s  perceptions  how  to  attain  it  are
different.Women  aim  at  stabilizing  food  expenditures  and  producing  small
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surpluses.Women need husband’s  consent  for  business  decisions,  despite  recent  laws
allowing females  to  become land owners,  still  meet  resistance in application.As  land
reform is to operate through the market, only land owners willing to sell will do so.The
restitution program covered only 1% of all commercial farm land and reached only 4% of
female-headed households, creating a huge credibility gap between official discourse and
reality.Women are twice excluded from productive land, as blacks and as women.
10 Bill Derman, Anne Hellum, “Land, Identity & Violence in Zimbabwe”. At independence
Europeans owned 36% of best farm land in the Commercial Farming Areas, while black
farmers were settled in Tribal Trust Lands (42% of total).The 1980 constitution put a 10-
year moratorium on land reform by expropriation.By 1992 ZANU PF Land Acquisition Act
empowered the President to acquire land: 71.000 households were resettled on voluntary
basis till 1998 on 3.5 million ha (10% of land).In 1998 a National Constitutional Assembly
called for a democratic constitution, and trade union (ZCTU) leaders founded MDC in 1999
to oppose ZANU and called a nation-wide strike against dismissal of farm workers on white
farms.ZANU created  its  own  Constitutional  Commission  and  drafted  a  Constitution
without  provisions  for  compensation,  but  was  defeated  in  referendum.Mugabe  just
amended the present constitution with expropriation clauses and ordered the National
War Veterans Association to occupy white farms.9 mills. ha were seized making 350.000
workers jobless and ZANU narrowly won the 2000 elections.White farm area decreased
from 36% to less than 6%.It was a chip in Mugabe’s policy to reward ZANU supporters and
evict ZCTU and MDC supporters from farms and employment.
11 Sten Hagberg’s, “Authority and Violence of a Hunters Association in Burkina Faso”, deals
with  land  conflict  indirectly  but  more  with  the  defense  of  Senufo  identity  against
property  attacks  by  pastoralists.Following  Côte-d’Ivoire’s  example  where  hunters’
associations  had been involved in  fighting  criminals  and cattle  smugglers  (who now
operate everywhere in Africa where Fulbe drive large herds to coastal markets), some
Senufo created Benkadi association in Comoe province.After division of the province, the
founder and main authority of  the association,  now lived in a new province and the
association  in  Comoe  province  elected  a  new  president.He  claimed  to  represent  his
province,  while  the  founder  himself  still  claimed  to  represent  the  overall
organization.The association challenged the state monopoly on violence, when it attacked
a Fulbe camp after farmer-herder altercations with local leaders and politicians getting
involved  while  police  intervened.In  discussing  the  question  of  legitimate  powers  in
societies without centralized authority the author defines authority as an attribution of
rights to control other people’s actions or decisions, whereas Skalnik proposes authority
and power as two mutually exclusive ideal types of organizing public affairs, signaling a
shift away from Weber’s classic distinction between “power” and “authority”.
12 Faustin Maganga et al., “Contested Identities and Resource Conflicts and in the Morogoro
Region in Tanzania”.Killings in Kilosa district in 2000 highlighted the tensions between
“Indigenous” and “Outsiders” in Kilosa district. Kaguru and Sagara were in pre-colonial
times mentioned as residents (wenyeji) of Ukaguru and Usagara, the major part of todays’
Kilosa district, and tribal boundaries were colonial constructs rather than inherent.
13 The conflicts are being portrayed in terms of ethnic stereotypes, herders and farmers,
locals and immigrants, but in reality, livestock owners—who are misconceived perceived
as  Masai,  and  therefore  as  immigrants—have  been  long  in  the  area  but  get  less
representation  in  land  conflicts.Tensions  are  recent,  after  long  coexistence,  due  to
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encroachment by urban land buyers on grazing lands, and pastoralists have no access to
the  large  state  ranches—when  they  become  privatized.Since  1999  the  Land  Act  and
Village Land Act recognizes customary rights village lands and might give the livestock
keepers—who are often incorporated into villages, more access to decision-making.
14 Witsenburg and Adano, “Use and Management of Water Resources in Kenya’s Drylands”,
present  one  of  the  best  researched  studies  in  this  volume.  Exploring  environmental
variables involved in conflicts around Mount Marsabit,  where various pastoral groups
share  a  common  environment  with  few  permanent  water  sites,  and  adapt  through
oscillating  dynamic  relations,  they  find  sharing  and  cooperation  in  well  and  water
management.This despite a tenfold population increase on Mt. Marsabit between 1929
and 1980 and declining rainfall. State-sponsored violence e.g. before and during elections,
and land-allocation programs has increased ethnic conflicts which are more orchestrated
by manipulative leaders than by water scarcity.Studies on the origin of violence should
focus more on those who own resources—and profit from more—than those who lack or
lose them,  because the current  focus  on poverty and resource scarcity  disguises  the
causal human factors behind violence.Their final conclusion is that “ethnicity” is not
more important than other identity-forming factors in Africa.
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